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August 29, 2010

Lost to the West

Filed under: Books — Camassia @ 11:38 am

I got this book from the library for my plane reading, and now I’m about two-thirds of the way through. The full title is Lost to the West: The Forgotten Byzantine Empire That Rescued Western Civilization, by Lars Brownworth. Brownworth, a high-school history teacher, feels that the Byzantine Empire has gotten shafted in western world-history courses, and I was interested in the book because I’d noticed that myself. I remember my own secondary-school textbook made the fall of Rome out to be a big historical turning point, ending classical civilization and launching the Dark Ages. But it added a one-sentence coda that said something like: “Meanwhile, the eastern Roman empire continued until it was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1453.” And I thought WTF? That’s a thousand years!

Brownworth argues, in fact, that the fall of Rome probably didn’t seem like such a big deal even to Romans at the time. “Rome” had already become a state of mind more than a place, as emperors tended to be off defending the frontiers more often than they were at home, and citizens all over the empire called themselves Romans. In fact, the name “Byzantine Empire” is a coinage of modern historians; during its whole existence, the polity called itself the Roman Empire, and its citizens Romans, even though they were mostly Greek-speaking. In the west, Germans had long been providing much of the military muscle and had become the power behind the throne, so when the German warlord Odoacer decided to dispense with the puppet emperor and take over Rome himself, it was more or less acknowledging the obvious. The book’s subtitle sounds like a callback to the famous How the Irish Saved Civilization, an impression amplified by the line in the introduction: “While civilization flickered dimly in the remote Irish monasteries of the West, it blazed in Constantinople, sometimes waxing, sometimes waning, but always alive.”

Why, then, did I not learn this in school? Brownworth has a few different suggestions. One is that it doesn’t fit the worldview of Enlightenment thinkers who called on “the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome” to buttress their case against the system of church and king that dominated their own era. It’s true that, if your idea of Greek civilization is Athenian democracy, the Byzantine Empire would be a letdown. (For that matter so would a lot of ancient Greek states other than Athens.) But Byzantium was inconvenient to the West for some time before that. One of the most provocative parts of the book is the description of the rise of Charlemagne from the Byzantine point of view. As Brownworth tells it, the Pope’s decision to crown Charlemagne Holy Roman Emperor was a big thumb in the eye of both the eastern empire and the eastern church. Events like that helped precipitate the eventual schism between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. And this, I suspect, also helps explain the general ignorance of eastern Christianity in the West. Protestants, like Enlightenment thinkers, were trying to restore a glorious past to which the eastern example provided only an embarrassing distraction. So nobody has had a motive to pay attention to it.

The eastern church and state also had a much longer and more complex relationship with Islam than did the West, which I should probably not post about until I’ve at least gotten through the Crusades. But I do mean to prove to bls and Lee that I’m not crazy. (Not about this, anyway.)

August 28, 2010

Scenes from California

Filed under: Travels — Camassia @ 4:14 pm

I’m back from a two-week vacation in my homeland, inasmuch as I have one. I had gotten the idea to go a few months ago, partly because I wanted to see family and friends, partly to shake myself out of the torpor I’d fallen into in Washington. After we sold my grandmother’s house, I was ready to settle in and take it easy for a while, and I did: eating too much, drinking too much, and watching too much TV. The scarcity of blogging over this period was largely because there wasn’t much interesting to say.

I realized, after a while, that I had to get up and try to rebuild my life, but for some reason I never had the appetite for it. I’m sure part of this was the trouble that was continuing to plague my family — my brother-in-law’s lymphoma, my sister’s thyroid condition, and various other problems that have developed. And unlike with the grandmother situation, there really wasn’t anything I could do to help. So it’s hard to get excited about doing anything, when I can’t be doing what I wish I were doing. But also, in our age when people can choose their extracurricular activities, they tend to form them around their passions — mountain biking, philosophy, chess, Jesus, or whatever — and I seem to have no passions left. Going to California was, in a way, like visiting my old self, back when I had them.

I flew into San Francisco, and when I arrived I realized I’d been away so long that the scenery looked distinctly alien to me. I remember back in the ’70s, in the first few years after we moved there, my mother would sometimes remark on how strange some part of the landscape looked — the hills that turned gold in the summertime from dried-up grass, the high fog in a sheet a hundred feet above the ground — which seemed perfectly ordinary to me. But looking at the city from the airport’s elevated people mover, I saw what she meant. In my mind’s eye, both California and Washington are covered with greenery; but I forget how bare and dessicated California’s plant life is, epitomized by the palm tree, that great tufted needle that provides neither shade nor shelter. It’s beautiful in its way, but it takes some getting used to. On the other hand, going east never seemed to take much of an adjustment. I imagine that’s because all of us Californians grew up with an idea of a “normal” landscape that looks eastern, or even European. I remember as a child learning the signs of the four seasons — autumn leaves, winter snows, etc. — that I almost never saw in real life.

Early in my trip I visited a cousin in Healdsburg, a small town in northern Sonoma County. I had never been there before — strange to think now how the northern edge of my universe used to be somewhere in Terra Linda — but the ecosystem was much the same as in Marin, with that familiar summer smell of dry meadow grass, and Himalayan blackberries growing wild for anyone willing to brave the thorns. The Bay area, unlike Washington, was having an unusually cool summer. It’s hard to convey to outsiders with “sunny California” in their heads just how chilly and gray S.F.’s summers are even in normal years, and this year it just sort of gave up and started impersonating British Columbia. I was prepared for this — I remember the morning I dressed for the flight, noticing how odd it was to put on socks for the first time in months — but it was still kind of a shock to the system. I remember one evening I did laundry, and hung up some of the clothes in my closet to dry; in the morning they had barely changed, as the house had spent the night enveloped in sea fog.

In San Francisco I also visited the California Academy of Sciences, one of my favorite places when I was a child, which had been completely rebuilt since my last visit there. I went to a lot of science museums on my road trip two years ago, and I recognized the changes as part of larger trends: more high-tech, more interactive, more ecological, and lower on cathedral-like open space. It was hard to accept that my old neoclassical museum was gone, but there were some cool additions. Pathways led you through an ersatz mangrove swamp, where uncannily large sharks and rays swam beneath your feet. The African Hall had most of the same dioramas, but they moved in some live animals to illustrate the variety of habitats there, including their longtime flock of South African penguins. And, though the carpeting didn’t exactly go with the pristine marble hall, it sure helped mute the yelling children.

The alligator pit — now called the “Southern swamp habitat” — now had an albino alligator, which was one of the strangest things I’d ever seen. The building now also has a landscaped roof that visitors can walk around on. Mostly it’s covered with tough, uninteresting ground cover, but they designed it with window-covered mounds that, according to the signs, are meant to echo San Francisco’s hilly landscape. To me, what they most recalled was the old Zeiss projector that used to be in the center of the planetarium, which has now gone digital. I understand why the technology is obsolete, but — but!

After five days of tramping around the Bay area, I drove to L.A. Staying on the PMC email list can come in handy, and that’s how I landed a house-sitting gig in Pasadena for the week. The house belongs to Rob Muthiah, former pastor and current Azusa professor, and being there reminded me of both the good and the bad of the church experience. I had been to the house for the last small group I attempted to be in, which was studying the epistle to the Colossians along with Colossians Remixed. I didn’t like Colossians Remixed, and it sort of overshadowed Colossians itself, so I gave up on the group after a few sessions. But after that, when I went on my road trip, Rob told his parents in North Dakota to put me up if I ever went through there; and they did, feeding me baloney sandwiches and giving me the run of the house when they took off on a preplanned trip somewhere. That almost unthinking generosity is one of the things I miss most, in this untrusting town.

The house itself had a kind of wholesome, idyllic feel to it. Unlike with most California houses, the original builder had chosen to sacrifice square footage for the sake of the back yard, which takes up about half the property and is shaded by a magnificent live oak. It’s a tiny house for a five-person family, but the yard clearly functions as a living space, with patio furniture, toys, a firepit and a detached garage all living under the tree. That had a sort of civilized Mediterranean feel to it, as did the fact that the house’s only television was tucked away in a closet, while the small living room was dominated by a piano and a pile of percussion instruments.

In Pasadena the weather turned hot again, and I took more than one opportunity to run off to the beach. There, California starts showing the character that the tourists know it for. I remember walking the sidewalk near Venice Beach behind a woman who was wearing, by God, Daisy Dukes with a bikini on top. And sun-kissed skin so hot it was getting reddish at the shoulders. And a pink purse, and cowboy boots. As I walked along behind her, marveling and just how short shorts can get on someone with no hips, she almost got plowed into by a bronze young man on a bicycle. He apologized, but she smiled at him, and he looked pleased to have attracted the attention of such a vision.

The beach itself has a parking lot surrounded by a simple wooden fence; and as I walked by it one evening, I saw a man in a kungfu outfit and straw hat climb atop one of the fenceposts, and stand there in deep concentration, as if gathering himself. As I watched discreetly, he abruptly took off running along the thin edge of the fence’s planking, and went about ten yards before he dropped off. It would have been cool to say he was some kind of martial-arts master, but he looked like he was having trouble keeping his balance. He got back on the fence though, and tried again. He was, I suppose, practicing.

But anyway, I didn’t do much sightseeing in L.A. My main business was seeing people I knew. In many ways, the relative lack of passions on my part made it easier. I went to church, and had deep conversations with friends, and hung out with my old boyfriend, and was aware of a lot of things coming up that used to frustrate me that didn’t really bother me any more. It made it easier to appreciate the good things, but I knew the frustrations were because I was really trying before, and now I was just passing through.

My mellow got a bit disturbed when I had breakfast with Telford, on my last day in California. I hadn’t seen him since the first day of my road trip, and I was wondering why he hadn’t updated his website since then, and had barely published anything. (OK, there was a book, but given the pace of publishing that was surely done by then.) There has, in fact, been a lot of drama going on in his life, which I don’t feel at liberty to discuss, but all the catching-up led to an intense three-and-a-half-hour breakfast. And it didn’t surprise me that Telford, of all the Christians I know, made the most direct effort to get me to come back to the church. When someone looks soulfully into your eyes and tells you the church needs your gifts, it feels scroogy to decline. But I also knew that I had been there, and done that. Only God knows what he wants from me, if he wants anything.

And then a long journey home, and then back to the grind. Where does all this leave me? Annoyingly, not very far from where I started. But I did do one thing since I got back: join Facebook. I’ve been alone too much for too long.

July 26, 2010

Thankful … for what?

Filed under: Uncategorized — Camassia @ 8:47 pm

Recently a guy at the Cato Institute explained why libertarians need Darwin. The essay ultimately concludes that it’s because Darwinism provides a basis for morality without God, which has been known to be a hot topic here on Musings & Searchings. But what really got me thinking was a five-year-old Wil Wilkinson essay he links called Capitalism and Human Nature.

Wilkinson admits in it that some aspects of human nature make it hard for capitalism to work. I could pick a few bones with some of his points, but I want to focus on the part about the shift from personal to impersonal transactions. In the old days, we knew most of the people we did business with. Nowadays, we have to somehow trust in all the strangers on whom we depend economically. And it is not really in human nature to trust strangers. “We live in two worlds, the face-to-face world of the tribe, family, school, and firm, and the impersonal, anonymous world of huge cities, hyper-specialization, and trans-world trade,” Wilkinson writes.

What to do about it? Wilkinson doesn’t really answer it directly, but his conclusion is suggestive: “Once we appreciate the improbability and fragility of our wealth and freedom, it becomes clear just how much respect and gratitude we owe to the belief systems, social institutions, and personal virtues that allowed for the emergence of our ‘wider civilization’ and that allow us to move between our two worlds without destroying or crushing either.”

This mention of gratitude reminds me of something I’ve been wondering ever since reading a bunch of articles on Ayn Rand, following the recent publication of a couple new biographies. I will admit my knowledge of her is all second-hand, so this may be wrong, but I get the impression that she feels society owes its creative achievers a lot more than they usually get, because their works are so beneficial. On the other hand, I also get the impression she thinks any Ubermensch worth his salt doesn’t do anything for anybody else, but strictly to self-actualize or something. So how much do you really owe someone who isn’t actually doing you a favor?

Wilkinson is right when he says, earlier in the essay, that reciprocity is pretty basic to human nature. But I suspect that equally basic is the importance of motive in reciprocity. Everyone knows that people can do you favors for selfish and even destructive reasons. Con men butter up wealthy women, drug dealers give discounts to get people hooked, politicians dole out pork to gain power, abusers play nice just long enough to keep you from leaving. People are rightly suspicious of such things. At the same time though, reciprocity isn’t altruism; anybody doing a favor in a reciprocal-type society would expect reward of some sort, so favors are always tinged with self-interest. I suppose reciprocity works best when self-interest and other-interest get into a happy muddle, so that people don’t think too hard about such things. That is more difficult when you’re dealing with strangers, which is perhaps why so many commercial transactions involve so much play-acting. Waiters act like you’re at their dinner party, saleswomen pretend to be your shopping buddy, and so on. Why do you and the grocery cashier thank each other after you’ve paid? Are you really grateful? Probably not, but it’s better to pretend you are.

But what Wilkinson is talking about here isn’t really gratitude towards persons, but towards “belief systems, social institutions and personal virtues.” It does seem to me that a common trait of materialists is the ability to feel grateful towards abstractions like that — toward science, toward nature, toward medicine, or what have you. It is, I think, harder for other people to feel that for something so inhuman and lacking any benevolent intent, which I suppose is one reason why gods are ever popular. The urge to thank something when good things happen is a common one, and is perhaps another sign of how deep reciprocity is in us. Yet it’s equally common for gratitude to fade when things become commonplace and taken for granted, and for it to disappear entirely when things go badly. The psalms of lament are nearly as numerous as the songs of praise, and the popularity of capitalism goes up and down with economic cycles. To expect more is asking for an awful lot of faith.

June 26, 2010

TV Notes

Filed under: Arts and entertainment — Camassia @ 2:23 pm

I must say, my second year in Washington is really showing me what a different climate I have moved into from California. The first four-season cycle I went through was pretty mild, but this year we’ve lurched from record snowfall to record heat. All this has added up to a lot of time indoors on my part, and — since reading about fascism all the time can get a girl down — an inordinate amount of TV watching. Here are some things I’ve been tuned into lately:

The Good Wife. This drama series is basically two shows in one: a legal drama that deals with one case per week, a la Law & Order, and a longer-form story about one of the lawyers, whose husband was the attorney general of Illinois before being thrown in prison for soliciting prostitutes, as well as the office politics inside her law firm. Recently I stumbled across the Onion AV Club’s write-up of this show, and was surprised at how exactly the author’s reaction lined up with my own. “I watch every episode, and I enjoy every episode, and I am impressed by just how much the show is able to squeeze out of the old workplace drama model. And then every week, I have to force myself to watch the new episode. Once I’m done, and I’m still in love, I say, “Man, why didn’t I want to watch that?” But the next week rolls around, and I’m not interested, and it takes me a moment to remember just how much I liked the last episode. It’s a never-ending cycle, and I don’t know why I’m stuck in it.”

It’s an interesting example-by-inverse of something I’ve wondered about as a fiction reader: what makes a novel a “page-turner,” even when you know it’s not very good? Books like that tend to be “comfort food,” of a sort: they take place in a world that has moral structure and direction and you expect things to be neatly wrapped up in the end. The legal half of The Good Wife is actually like that. Although the lawyers engage in a lot more skulduggery than Perry Mason did, the show is basically optimistic that the courts can be a vehicle for justice. The other half of the show is exactly the opposite. It takes place in the world of Chicago politics, after all, and everyone swims in moral murk. The characters are rarely perfectly honest with each other, to the point that the audience can also feel left out of what’s really going on. Moral ambiguity can make for great drama, of course, but it is harder to fit into the needs of storytelling. There needs to be some kind of arc — a fall, a redemption, a learning experience, etc. — and right now, I don’t know where these characters are heading but sort of dread it. Maybe that’s why it’s hard to go back and watch.

Man vs. Wild/Survivorman
. This is not really the sort of thing I would have thought I’d like. Each of these two shows follows a man dropped into some remote wilderness location with minimal gear, who then survives off the land for a number of days, explaining his methods as he goes. This is the sort of vocation that seems a little bit nuts, and the fact that they kill animals onscreen makes me wince (though we are talking mainly about insects here). But I guess the appeal of the wilderness locations to my apartment-bound self is obvious, and I find that following a man going through them on foot gives me a more ground-level, you-are-there sense of them than the more panoramic nature documentaries I’ve watched all my life. The Sahara desert seems like a far more interesting place now that I’ve tracked Bear Grylls through it on Man vs. Wild; there are sand dunes and oases, yes, but there are also trees popping up in the middle of nowhere, clusters of bushes with huge poisonous gourds, and the odd Bedouin offering you a goat testicle out of hospitality.

Though the two shows have a very similar format, they have somewhat different attitudes. Survivorman, the older show (it ended in 2008), features stoic Canadian survivalist Les Stroud filming himself in complete solitude for seven days. Although he is usually within hiking distance of a support crew, he understands the peril of his situation and plays things pretty conservatively, avoiding most hazards, fasting rather than eating something that might make him sick, and occasionally bailing out early if things are just not working out. Grylls, a flamboyant Englishman, takes his camera crew along with him and plunges into practically every danger he comes across; if the natural environment doesn’t bring enough excitement, they’ll stage a challenge for him. This sometimes makes Man vs. Wild seem less like survivalism than like a wilderness-based circus act. And if you’re impressed by sword swallowers, you should see the stuff that Bear eats. I sometimes wonder if he’s being a bad influence on younger viewers; watching him could take those playground games of “I dare you to eat that!” to a whole new level.

Still, I have a hard time holding it against Bear because he always seems to be having so much fun. As scripted TV seems to keep getting darker and more cynical, I often find myself turning to reality shows if I want to be put in a good mood. Such as…

Clean House. This is a variation on the home-makeover show, focusing on people with insane amounts of clutter. The crew swoops in on homeowners who are getting buried in their own junk, persuades them to part with many of their beloved objects, holds a yard sale, and uses the money to refurbish what’s left. I wouldn’t have been interested in this show a few years ago, but going through the long, arduous process of clearing out my grandparents’ house really made me a fan. As a “reality” show it’s at the Man vs. Wild level of stageyness, but it still captures the mixture of comedy and horror in such an enterprise. And the conversations with the homeowners, with their conflicted attitudes (“Save me from all this crap! No wait, don’t take that!”) make me feel a bit like I’m finally hearing the other half of the conversation I kept having with my grandfather in my head: “What on earth were you thinking? What the heck is this thing?” And of course, it all ends happily.

Star Wars: The Clone Wars. This is another show that I’m kind of surprised to find myself liking. While I don’t feel that George Lucas raped my childhood, I did feel things were going downhill with the prequels, so watching the weekly cartoon version seemed like eating something way past its expiration date.

When I finally did see an episode though, I remembered the line from some Internet critic to the effect of, “Finally, Star Wars has become the Saturday matinee serial it always was in its heart.” Since the show takes place within an already finished story (specifically, between Episodes II and III), it does not have the burden of trying to move forward an epic narrative, and can go back to just having fun. You get the tone right off from the narrator who gets us rolling on each episode, who I could swear is the same guy who narrated Superfriends back in the ’70s. It’s just that pulpy. The computer animation, to my untrained eye, looks really good, and shows that ILM hasn’t exhausted its imagination yet. Like the movies, the series borrows plot elements from all over the place, but it isn’t even bothering to hide it anymore. One set of adventures featured a giant prehistoric animal awakened from its long slumber who goes on a rampage, called (naturally) the Zillo Beast.

Amidst all the lighthearted fun, though, I think the series does honor one element of the original film that the prequels didn’t. When Obi-Wan first tells Luke about his father, he says, “He was the best star-pilot in the galaxy, and a cunning warrior. … And he was a good friend.” Anakin seems like such a mess throughout the prequels that you don’t really see that, but the series, unencumbered by the Darth Vader plotline, is essentially a buddy show about the Republic’s top two enforcers. It makes me feel even more strongly that Lucas is best at telling heroic tales of adventure, not morally ambiguous tragedies.

June 23, 2010

More on nationalism

Filed under: Books, Politics and society — Camassia @ 9:14 am

For those of you who even remember my last post (aarggh, where does the time go?), I wanted to elaborate a little more on the pull of nationalism in the early 20th century European milieu in which fascism developed. It was a time when nationalism was the happening thing. World War I was dispiriting to western Europe, but it brought about the fulfillment of many nationalist aspirations. Poland was reconstituted after spending 150 years carved up between the Germans and the Russians; the countries of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were created out of the remains of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Robert O. Paxton, in The Anatomy of Fascism, explains that liberals of the day — who were sort of cosmopolitan libertarians at that point — “wanted to organize the world by the principle of self-determination of nations. Satisfied nationalities, each within its own state, would coexist in such natural harmony, according to liberal doctrine, that no external force would be needed to keep the peace.” Of course, that’s not how it turned out. The ethnic subgroups within the new countries were unsatisfied, eventually leading to the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; in the nearer term, the states that had lost territory wanted to avenge themselves, helping augment the rise of fascist governments in those countries.

What interests me about the liberal view of the time is that, although it sounds hopelessly idealistic when Paxton spells it out like that, the idea that self-determination is a cure for expansionist ambition keeps cropping up everywhere. One of the odder examples of this was Jim Pinkerton’s 2007 essay holding up Tolkien’s hobbits as model citizens: without big dreams, simply defending their own territory and getting on with their lives. What was odd about it was that he posited this as a strategy against a rising radical Islam. He imagines “Christendom” pulling together in a sort of geographic monoculture, drawing a physical border between itself and the Islamic world which it could then militarily defend. As for Israel, he imagines that Christians and Muslims can striked a grand deal. “When all Christians, and all Muslims, are brought to the bargaining table, they all become stakeholders in a pacific outcome.”

It’s funny that this piece appeared in The American Conservative magazine, because it sounds a lot like the Wilsonian liberal international vision Paxton described above, only with religion taking the place of nation. And various libertarians, localists and social democrats have also posited versions of this idea, though usually built around smaller entities: states, communities, families, individuals, or some combination of the above. What they all have in common is a version of the idea that, if you just let people run their own lives, the urge to impose themselves on others will be greatly diminished. The error people make, this line of thinking goes, is believing in universal standards and morals; that keeps tempting people to meddle in others’ affairs.

The rise of fascism offers a serious rebuke to this idea. As I pointed out in my last post, one surprising thing about them was that they didn’t believe in universal ideologies; their doctrines, Paxton points out, were flexible, intermingled with national traits and interests, and therefore unexportable. They did not really aim to make the rest of the world like them, but that didn’t stop them from wanting to rule.

Why the difference? One factor, as I have already noted, is that the defeated imperial powers looked into themselves and their pasts and saw, well, imperial powers. To turn into hobbits wouldn’t have exactly been in character, it would have been imposed on them by losing the war. But also noteworthy is the fact that Paxton says several times that fascists saw themselves as part of a “Darwinian struggle” between peoples. I don’t know how much they literally thought of it in terms of Darwinian selection, but evidently they assumed competition to be the natural state of things. If we don’t conquer, the thinking goes, someone will conquer us.

In thinking that way, the fascists actually had a pretty good point. World history certainly supports the conquer-or-be-conquered thesis. Factors such as population growth, climate change, and resource exhaustion, that have obliged people to keep migrating throughout history, playing havoc with the everybody-stay-within-bounds idea. And it points up a fact that is often ignored, namely, the peace-through-self-determination scheme actually is a universalist ideology. Everyone in it has to be about equally hobbitlike. If just one group breaks out and decides to conquer the world, and they gain anything from it, that will pretty well wreck the general social compact. Localism, in a sense, works best if you think globally: it is best for society as a whole if I stay within my community bounds. If you really look at the world from an entirely local point of view — here are my people, and the rest of the world is alien and much bigger than we are — you can see how that wouldn’t lend itself to peace.

June 10, 2010

Fascism, nationalism, and other good stuff

Filed under: Books, Politics and society — Camassia @ 9:39 am

I’ve been reading Robert Paxton’s The Anatomy of Fascism lately, as it seems relevant to the subjects I’ve been posting about. (Posting very slowly I know — sorry!) The connection to racial identity is obvious, but I actually first thought I should read about fascism when I described my own problems with democratic politics. The ideal of human community as a harmonious hive, the vaguely biological concept of a healthy society — sounds slightly familiar, no? So I thought I should look into it, not so much to break Godwin’s Law on myself, but to see if the similarity means anything, and if so, where the fascists went wrong.

So far, I’ve read about the earliest fascist movements and their philosophical forebears, and they are familiar in some surprising ways. One thing I didn’t quite realize is that one of the philosophical bases for fascism was the impossibility of knowing objective truth. Fascist doctrine, Paxton points out, is rather difficult to make general statements about because it embraced the particularity of every country it appeared in, and so was not really made for export; and because a fixed set of principles wasn’t as important as the mystical unity of nation and leader. Fascism “replaced politics with aesthetics” Paxton quotes someone as saying (I forget who), and in some ways it does sound like fascists movements had the unity of a bunch of fans of the same rock band as activists in a political movement.

I think this sounds so familiar because it sounds so much like the broadly postmodern/emergent/anabaptist Christians I’ve been hanging out with the last few years. They also reject the Enlightenment idea of how to know truth, instead turning to a sort of communalism centered around devotion to a person (in this case, Jesus). They also tend to distrust large-scale economies like capitalism and socialism and have an intermittent romance with a more localist agrarian past, which the early fascists also did. They also like the idea of themselves as an entire alternative society, rather than just an actor within a society. Paxton writes that when Mussolini decided to run for office, the purists of the movement saw this as an unacceptable compromise. “Idealistic early fascists saw themselves as offering a new form of public life — an “antiparty” — capable of gathering the entire nation, in opposition to both parliamentary liberalism, with its encouragement of faction, and socialism, with its class struggle,” he writes.

But the differences are equally conspicuous. What really made the fascists what they were was that once they lost faith in universal truth and the global economy, their alternative was nationalism. Indeed, when it came to real-world politics, nationalism got priority over virtually all other fascist precepts. It’s rather difficult for me to relate to that. Probably one reason is that nations in Europe are rather different from America. Although both Germany and Italy are relatively new countries, formed in the 19th century, they could call on broad ethnic identities that were very old. The U.S.A. can’t really escape its origins as a country based on an idea or a philosophy rather than an identification with land and ancestors. Race is about the closest thing Americans have to that pre-rational type of identity, which is doubtless why race is the central fixation of such fascist movements as there are in the U.S. But even that has a problem: the white race is much bigger than America, especially given the broad way Americans construe it. (The German definition of “Aryan” allowed them to rule out all sorts of people we would consider white.) As such, I don’t think America can ever be particular in quite the way European countries are. Even the most fervent patriots around here tend to see it as the apotheosis of universal qualities: it’s the freest country, the most Christian, or whatever.

Another conspicuous difference is that as much as fascists liked unity, they were also obsessed with militarism. Many of them believed that war was good for both individual and social health. Paxton doesn’t elaborate greatly on this line of thinking, but definitely one factor is that fascists drew on a great many veterans of World War I. It’s difficult for Americans to fathom how vast the impact this war had, in terms of what percentage of people fought in it, and were killed in it or otherwise affected by it. Only the Civil War compared in that respect; but whereas the Civil War, for the victors at least, fit well enough into the modern narrative of progressive freedom, the Great War brought on existential doubts even for the victors. This led to some great antiwar artworks, but on the other hand, it also left many veterans feeling that the ungrateful, and now alien, civilian world really owed them something. At the same time, they may have wanted to bring the things they really liked about war to civilian life. In his classic essay Why Men Love War, William Broyles described experiences that fit fascism to a T: the sense of comradeship, the intensity of life on the edge of death, the “eerie clarity” that removes all the gray areas, the escape from mundane realities and responsibilities, the relief from the anxieties of freedom. The fact that so few Americans today have actual war experience may account for how certain fascist-like impulses can actually coexist with pacifism.

But of course the 800-pound gorilla of differences is religion. Like I said, many modern Christians feel a fascist-like devotion to a person, but that person is not on earth (not now, anyway). On the other hand, devotion to an earthly leader, or desire for one to come along, seemed to be the sine qua non of fascism. This is also a bit difficult for me to relate to as an American, perhaps because I don’t come from the European tradition of monarchy. Sure, Americans fall in love with political leaders all the time, but they don’t tend to build a normative politics around the idea of absolute dictatorship. But whatever the reason, fascism’s totalizing politics made religion as much a competitor as anything else. The movement’s attitude toward Christianity seemed to range between ambivalence and indifference. Sure, Christian churches were part of the particular national cultures that fascists purported to defend; but the universalist nature of the faith rather put them at odds with playing such a role.

Still, I have a lot of questions after reading the first fifty-odd pages of the book, which I’m not sure Paxton is going to answer. I wrote the last couple posts asking what the purpose of race is, and am therefore interested in the fact that the idea of “national destiny” was apparently a big part of fascist thinking. But so far Paxton hasn’t explained what these supposed destinies are or where they came from. It would also be interesting to hear more about how Italians conceived of “la razza” in a fascist way without necessarily thinking of it in a biological way — apparently, the obsession with biological purity was really a Germanic thing. But we’ll see what develops, as we get into the era where fascists actually start to hold power.

May 19, 2010

The purposes of race part 2: the revenge

Filed under: Politics and society — Camassia @ 9:12 am

One of my regrets about my very spotty blogging as of lately is that I didn’t blog all the way through Laura Blumenfeld’s Revenge: A Story of Hope. I did eventually finish it, and was, I must say, completely gobsmacked by the ending — it was so cinematic I’m not 100% sure it actually happened, but it’s a great read. In one of the posts I did write about it, I mentioned her discussion of the role of revenge in bonding between families and others. “In aboriginal Siberia,” she writes, “the word for kindred families is cin-yirin, meaning ‘collection of those who take part in blood revenge.’”

I can’t escape the feeling that revenge has a role in the persistence of American racial identity. By creating a common grievance among black people, white Americans created a common motivation for revenge, and therefore, a common reason to fear them. I remember during the last presidential election, a commenter on a British newspaper’s online coverage wondered if Obama was going to take advantage of his position to take revenge against white people on behalf of black people — because that’s what the commenter himself would want to do, if he were a black American. Such notions seem pretty outlandish, especially when applied to Obama, but it has, I think, been bubbling in the American subconscious for a long time.

Probably the most illustrative case is Malcolm X. Although people worried about his inciting violence in his lifetime, his main form of racial vengeance was returning slander with slander. You think we’re an inferior race? Hey, you’re the inferior race! The story about a mad scientist creating the white race wasn’t original to him, but his rhetorical gifts made it weirdly compelling even to people who didn’t literally believe it. And I can’t help suspecting that, although Malcolm’s fans like to emphasize his late conversion from racism, he would not be so interesting a character if he didn’t give voice to that irrational sense of justice. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a lie for a lie. This of course goes against the idea that justice is inseparable from truth — you must first find out what really happened — but in the old reciprocity ethic, it makes perfect sense. Slander is a form of injury that isn’t quite like anything else, and you probably can’t know what it feels like to think you’re the inferior race unless you do.

I don’t know any white person that believes the Nation of Islam’s theory of racial origins, but I have known some with at least a vague idea that theirs is a genetically nasty race. A co-worker I had some years ago claimed that the reason white people conquered most of the world is that “the Cro-Magnons ate the Neanderthals.” There are a lot of problems with that theory of course, but you can see how it’s really white supremacy turned on its head. There’s that old Paleolithic ancestor again, forming those traits that redound to the present day, only in this case it’s a bad thing.

Eventually, Malcolm X realized that the world is bigger than America’s racial conflicts. In his autobiography, he describes a stopover in Egypt on his way to Mecca, where he meets a white man who “didn’t feel like a white man.” It was a clue that American whiteness is a cultural identity, not a racial one, and a rather parochial cultural identity at that. Malcolm didn’t live long enough to form a full-blown alternative to his former views, but his story has been a source of hope every since. Maybe it is possible to go through revenge and come out the other side.

May 13, 2010

The purposes of race — part 1

Filed under: Politics and society — Camassia @ 6:29 pm

Russell was kind enough to quote my posts on government and teleology in his own musings on the election in Britain. It’s funny how, even though we are basically agreeing with each other here, whenever I read him on the subject I get the feeling we’re talking about different things. I think this may be because he’s an academic who’s been thinking about all this at an advanced level for many years, whereas I’m still working on the basics, like “What is government for?” Lately, I’ve been thinking about a slightly different question: what is ethnic identity for?

I’ve been thinking about this partly because yet another kerfuffle recently broke out on the Internet over race and IQ, and partly because of Kelefa Sanneh’s recent review of “whiteness studies.” Sanneh mentions David Roediger’s advocacy of the “abolition of whiteness,” which I remember hearing Roediger discuss on the radio some years back. In one sense, abolishing whiteness sounds ridiculous. We tend to think of race and ethnicity as things thrust upon us from the past, embedded in our genes, like family. And of course, people tend to think of ethnicity as being family writ large: we’re descended from common ancestors, we look alike, we act alike, and so on. That’s true enough, but the family analogy also shows the limitations of defining groups by traits. Everyone in my immediate family, for instance, is quite tall. Still, there are short people in my extended family, my sister married a short guy, and if they have children they might too be short. So while tallness is certainly an inborn, heritable trait that runs in my family, it doesn’t define my family. What defines my family, like most families, is the fact that we are related.

To some extent, of course, all white people are related; but our common ancestor was back in the Stone Age sometime, whereas many white and nonwhite Americans share common ancestors who were a lot more recent. The renewed interest among African-Americans in genealogy is showing just how related black and white Americans are. So that raises a natural question: why are we still identifying with this long-forgotten Paleolithic ancestor when there are much more immediate connections to think about?

There are several possible answers to that question, but one that Sanneh doesn’t bring up is that you can’t abolish whiteness without abolishing blackness. At least, I don’t see how. If every nonwhite race keeps its identity, then whites kind of have to be a race by default. Either that or we break up into sub-races, like was once the case in Europe, but I don’t see how that could happen in America.

And in fact, the question of why blackness goes on existing is just as legitimate. Blackness was not an African idea; it came about mainly to define an occupational role, a slave class. That occupation no longer exists in the West, so blackness is now essentially defined by the past: these are the descendants of people who used to be slaves. That identification has helped preserve discrimination, but I suspect that most black people would also be alarmed at the idea of black identity disappearing. For that matter, so would a lot of white people. In a lot of ways, the story of black Americans is the modern Exodus, a stunning testimonial inspiring — and warning — people far beyond its original ethnic group. But does the new version of Exodus, like the old one, require the continued existence of the relevant group? And is it worth all the trouble? In one sense, it’s strange to keep a whole multigenerational identity alive just to tell a story, but sometimes I wonder if there’s anything to nationhood but stories.

There are other possible answers to the question, but I will get into that in a future post.

May 11, 2010

Big government and big business: Iron Man edition

Filed under: Arts and entertainment, Politics and society — Camassia @ 8:13 pm

Saw Iron Man 2 this weekend with Eve, who wrote a mildly spoilery review of it here. I didn’t see the first one, which perhaps is why I felt so emotionally uninvested in it, but I am amused to note that it did raise some of the property-rights issues I’ve been blogging about intermittently here. In the film, Tony Stark’s Iron Man suit is so powerful that entire countries fear him; in his words, he’s “privatized world peace.” The U.S. government thinks he should share the technology, seeing as such things are supposed to be the government’s business. But Stark demurs that it’s his suit.

This issue has been raised more than once in superhero movies; in The Dark Knight, we had Morgan Freeman declaring, “This is too much power for one person!” But it’s a measure of the attitudinal difference between the two films that that line comes late in the movie, leaving audiences to debate it over drinks afterward, while Iron Man 2 raises it early and then drowns it out with crashing metal. The only reviewer I’ve noticed make a point of it was — natch — at Reason, but he likewise brought it up only to blow it off.

Of course, the situation in the movie isn’t likely to happen anytime soon, so maybe it doesn’t matter. But it did kind of remind me of the House of Saud, only in reverse. While Ibn Saud was a desert warlord who almost accidentally found himself a corporate titan, Tony is a corporate titan who almost accidentally finds himself a warlord. And, as with Sauds, the line between the two of them starts to look awfully arbitrary. Politics is, after all, ultimately about power, and so anyone with enough power becomes a de facto political figure, whether he admits it or not. Moreover, even a strict belief in the right of self-determination doesn’t necessarily mean you get to solely determine what your role in society is. I would think that society has some say over that.

Also, Tony’s lopsided amount of power isn’t quite so implausible from the point of view of a smaller country. In fact, his relationship to the U.S. in the movie is not entirely unlike Allen Stanford’s relationship with Antigua, back before he was arrested. There are companies out there whose revenue is greater than the GDP of some nations; what can national sovereignty mean in such a world?

April 29, 2010

Big government ad absurdum

Filed under: Politics and society — Camassia @ 8:52 am

Jill Lepore’s recent article about Tea Party activists includes a passage that summarizes neatly the themes of my last two posts:

Today’s Tea Partiers like to describe their movement as a catchall—Hess identifies himself as a libertarian, Varley describes herself as a social and fiscal conservative—but it doesn’t catch everything. “All the government does is take my money and give it to other people,” Hess told me. Hess’s own salary is paid by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security; he works for M.I.T.’s Lincoln Laboratory, studying chemical and biological warfare. “I’m not an anarchist,” he said. “It’s not that I think all government is bad.” Opposition to military power doesn’t have a place in Hess’s Tea Party.

What strikes me here isn’t his making an exception for military power, but the fact that he thinks the government is taking his money, even though the money comes from the government in the first place. This is part of what makes the concept of property rights so fuzzy in the modern context. When your income derives from skilled labor, your property is generally derived not from natural resources you control but from the market value of your job. What that is is hard enough to determine even in the private sector; but what is the market value of a military engineer? We could only find out if we allowed a market for people to build biological weapons for the highest bidder, which is a pretty alarming thought. But somewhere, Hess got an idea of what he should be paid, and thinks the government is misusing what is rightfully his.

Although in prior posts I emphasized the more exalted government jobs, the civil service is also full of ordinary jamokes like Hess, for whom working for the government isn’t much different from working for a large corporation. In fact, if he were a corporate employee grumbling about how management was misspending money that could have gone into his raise, he would hardly be seen as a libertarian champion. Yet the complaint is essentially the same, which is perhaps the real source of the Tea Party’s anger: in a world of big government, big business, and big everything, most individuals depend financially upon institutions that are too big to even notice them.

But I am still wondering if there’s a better way for people like Hess to think about their jobs, and the property that they derive from those jobs. If we think of individuals as bearing natural rights and governments as a natural threat to those rights, his status as both at once seems to be irreconcilable. But he’s right about one thing: if you’re not an anarchist, somebody has to do it.

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