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September 29, 2005

Providence rules

Filed under: Theology (other) — Camassia @ 12:12 pm

In a comment to my last post, Lee asked:

Does the fact that Latin Christendom managed to turn back Islam at Tours and ultimately eject it fromt the Iberian penninsula mean that they were doing something right?

OK, I’ll admit that when I said that the Muslim conquest of Byzantium might have indicated God’s judgment, I opened a pretty dicey subject that could lead us on a direct route to Jerry Falwell saying that the 9/11 attacks happened because of America’s pagans and homosexuals. So let me clarify.

I wrote about the church in the context of God’s covenant with it, and his promise that “the gates of hell shall not prevail.” But God is only known to have made a covenant with two entities — the church and Israel. So my first disagreement with Falwell’s saying that God lifted his “veil of protection” is that I see no reason to believe that America had a veil of protection in the first place. America has been fortunate in a lot of ways, but I don’t see all good fortune as a sign of God’s approval.

It’s a little-noted fact that when Jesus is describing bad behavior in litanies like Matthew 6, his only comment about the consequences of their actions is “They have received their reward.” In other words, he acknowledges that people who pursue earthly things are often rewarded with earthly things. Therefore, I don’t doubt that a country that pursues an empire can receive an empire, with no help from God. An army can win a battle simply by having better weaponry and better tactics. But they retain the reward only so long as they have those advantages, and the world being the way it is, that will not be forever.

So in some sense, I think you can detect God’s favor more from people’s defeats than their victories. When the church first appeared it was persecuted, but it grew anyway. When barbarians conquered Christianized Rome, the Christians converted their conquerors, and so church growth continued. The shocking thing about the conquest of Byzantium isn’t that the Christians lost the battles, but that so many of them defected to their conquerors’ religion, and almost nobody went the other way. This exposes that there was something false about the church’s apparent success, to the extent that it was supported by human power rather than God’s. Since the Western church defeated the Muslims militarily, they avoided being put to that test.

September 28, 2005

All apologies

Filed under: Church and state,Interfaith relations — Camassia @ 3:00 pm

I left an off-the-cuff comment on this post, which I think now might have been a bit simplistic. Being a low-church American I don’t really get the whole “state church” thing, but the Church of England has a different relationship to the state and so maybe the idea of “institutional repentance” makes more sense in that context. And even those of us belonging to un-established churches probably shouldn’t just wash our hands of what the rest of society does. Pacifists are sometimes accused of simply wanting to keep themselves pure while other people do the dirty business of politics and death, and my remark probably only added to that impression.

If people are in the mood for repenting, then, perhaps the first task is to critically examine why the church wasn’t listened to. Jesus warns his followers repeatedly that some people would reject their message, but we also have Paul saying things like this. And Vaughn himself quoted Clement of Alexandria a while ago: “If your neighbor sins, then you also sin. For if you had kept yourself as the Word demands, your neighbor would have been so ashamed on seeing how you live that he would not have sinned.” This seems especially true if you are as big as the Anglican Communion, and so many of your congregation don’t seem to be listening to you. So it seems like any failure of that magnitude calls for some introspection. Did we really preach the Gospel rightly? Did we do it with love? Were any of our little ego demands creeping in? And so on. It seems to me that if public repentance lacks those elements, it’s just the same old political criticisms dressed falsely in sackcloth and ashes.

Secondly, there is the question of the role of Christian-Muslim relations in all this. Some Christian leaders do seem to have taken to the war on Iraq, and indeed the whole war on terror, as a holy war against infidels. But that doesn’t seem to be a majority view among the war’s supporters, and anyway, not all Muslims are Iraqis, not all Iraqis are Muslims, and not all Iraqis and Muslims opposed the invasion. Still, it is true that the war occurs within a long history of conflict that goes all the way back to the beginning of Islam, and everyone knows it.

There is an inherent conflict between the two faiths that won’t be resolved until Judgment Day, I figure. They make claims about the same God, the same person (Jesus) and the same planetful of people that are in many ways similar but also have irreconcilable elements. They’re both evangelical by nature. And unfortunately, the public discussion about this seems to be dominated by holy warriors or by pluralists whose attitude is, “Conflict? What conflict?” For Christians who fall in neither of those camps — which is most, I suspect — there doesn’t seem to be a clear policy toward that other big monotheistic religion out there.

Islam has always been a real challenge to Christian self-confidence. For six centuries the Church was on a phenomenal growth curve, seeming to fulfill the promise that the gates of hell shall not prevail. But Islam reversed this trend by conquering and converting most of the formerly Christian Byzantium and north Africa, and for a while much of Spain. It’s not surprising that the early Christus Victor imagery gave way to more punishing theories of what Jesus’ visit to earth accomplished. What happened to the divine promise of protection?

There are many possible answers to that question. But if we’re following the Old Testament pattern, defeats by enemies are generally signs that God is not real happy with what you’re doing. Which brings us back to the first point: failure calls for self-examination. That’s what Telford suggested down in the second part of this post, when he speculated what Christianity of that era looked like to its conquerers:

The Byzantine Church in conquered lands was still in political communion with the state religion of an enemy empire. It was (and remains) constitutionally unable to free itself from its own political theology. Having lived by Caesar’s sword, it was dying by Caesar’s sword. Having supplemented the weakness of God with the strength of the world, it lost the power that had once survived an empire. What Muslim tribe, newly rich from the plunder of much of the Mediterranean, was going to join that?

This goes to a point I made in one of my earlier posts. I am increasingly convinced that mission is inevitably compromised by Christian participation in state violence. Why does the Christian mission in India struggle so? Well, pretend you’re Indian. When you think ‘Christianity’, what comes to mind? The Church of England, that’s what. Ready to join now?

Ouch. It’s a good Mennonite answer, and not everybody is going to agree with it. But I think he makes some good points about what Christians have to apologize to and for. I don’t think Christianity somehow owes “Islam” an apology, which is what the bishops seem to be thinking by having Christian leaders apologize to Muslim leaders. (But I’ll admit I haven’t read the whole 101-page document, so I could be wrong.) Yet it does owe repentance to all the people for whom it did not (and still does not) provide a better alternative.

September 26, 2005

The bad seed

Filed under: Books — Camassia @ 5:43 pm

Maybe I’m getting sensitive in my old age, but I think Josephine Tey’s The Franchise Affair is the most appalling novel I’ve read since my ill-advised foray into Clive Barker. And Barker was at least trying to be appalling. Tey delivers a morality tale that she expects all right-thinking people to agree with, which I suppose is true if you think all right-thinking people believe in eugenics.

The story concerns a small-town English lawyer who decides to defend a middle-aged woman and her mother, whom a 15-year-old girl claims imprisoned and beat her for almost a month. The press and much popular opinion sides with the girl, but the lawyer thinks it’s just a cover story for her disappearance. (The curious resemblance to the Tawana Brawley case is a coincidence, since that happened 40 years after the book was written.)

The girl is an adopted war orphan, which serves Tey’s central theme: criminals are born, not made. Her adoptive family consists of nice, decent people who love her; but when the lawyer inquires after her biological parents, he learns her mother was a selfish trollop who essentially abandoned her daughter. The girl, then committed her crime simply because she’s “her mother’s daughter,” and no other reason.

Much of the book’s philosophy comes from the mouth of another lawyer.

“Your true criminal,” he remembered Kevin saying one night, after a long discussion on penal reform, “has two unvarying characteristics, and it is these two characteristics that make him a criminal. Monstrous vanity and colossal selfishness. And they are both as integral, as ineradicable, as the texture of the skin. You might as well talk of ‘reforming’ the colour of one’s eyes.”

… Kevin’s idea of prison reform, Robert remembered, was deportation to a penal colony. An island community where everyone worked hard. This was not a reform for the benefit of prionsers. It would be a nicer life for the warders, Kevin said; and would leave more room in this crowded island for good citizens’ houses and gardens; and since most criminals hated hard work more than they hated anything in this world, it would be a better deterrent than the present plan which, in Kevin’s estimation, was no more punitive than a third-rate public school.

The opposite pole to this view is presented in the character of a bishop, who never appears but is endlessly bad-mouthed by the other characters, who spends much of his time arguing that criminals are products of an unjust society. But Tey’s genetic determinism leaves no possibility of an unjust society, as this comment from the younger of the two defendants indicates:

“The Saxons have the two qualities that I value most in this world. Two qualities that explain why they have inherited the earth. Kindness and dependability — or tolerance and responsibility, if you prefer the terms. Two qualities the Celt never had; which is why the Irish have inherited nothing but squabbles.”

Hail Britannia, Britannia rules the waves.

Needless to say, the girl doesn’t get any slack on account of her young age. She was born a monster, so there is no question of her being old enough to be morally responsible. In fact, the sadistic hatred that Tey conveys toward her is quite chilling, especially the way the lawyer announces his intention not just to throw doubt her story, but “undress her in court.”

My irritation at this book was no doubt increased by the fact that last month I read a much better book on similar themes: P.D. James’ Innocent Blood. It also centers around an adopted teenage girl with criminal parents — in this case much worse, in fact, since they were convicted of raping and murdering a little girl. When 18-year-old Philippa obtains her birth records, her pedophile father has died in prison, but her mother is about to be released on parole.

In some ways James’ and Tey’s views are similar, since they are both socially conservative Brits. (The mystery genre lends itself to conservatism, after all.) In fact, James was one of the judges for that prize that Telford almost won, and a lot of Telford’s critiques of modern liberal society turn up in this book. Like Tey, she also doesn’t go for simplistic victims-of-society explanations of crime (as embodied by Philippa’s adoptive father, a Marxist sociologist). But what separates the two authors is that James has thoroughly imbibed a Christian view of good and evil, to which Tey only pays lip service.

Genetics do matter in Innocent Blood. When Philippa meets her mother she recognizes her at once as family. She has many of her mother’s traits, both good and bad: intelligence, love of reading, confidence, willfulness, coldness. But James drops many broad hints that Philippa’s quest to “find herself”, which leads her to accept her mother even as a murderess, is ultimately not going to be satisfied in knowing her bloodlines. She is her mother’s daughter, but she is principally a child of God.

But what really separates Tey from James is that James believes, in her bones, in original sin. Tey clearly divides the world into The Good Sort and The Bad Sort, and invites the readers’ sympathy over the wronged women and our righteous triumph at the defeat of evil. But no one is really innocent in James’ universe. (The title, I expect, is meant partly in irony.) In addition to Philippa’s story, we follow the murdered girl’s father, who tracks the murderess in search of revenge. James does an impressive job of holding all these characters at once in our sympathy, while also showing their many flaws, without ever letting the reader feel superior.

The one really “good” character is the mother’s probation officer, who appears briefly bringing an African violet to brighten up the murderess’ dingy apartment. James characterizes his attitude as (quoting from memory here), “We’re all in this catastrophe together, so there’s no point in recriminations or regrets. The only thing for it is to treat each other with love.” I can just imagine Tey fulminating in righteous fury.

Innocent Blood is not a perfect book; the ending, in particular, started to feel more like parable than realism, which didn’t really go with the tone. But it’s a welcome tonic for the Tey book, and the one I hope I’ll hold longer in memory.

September 21, 2005

Blogwatch: end-of-summer edition

Filed under: Blogwatches — Camassia @ 1:49 pm

That giant bulge I remember in Jennifer’s stomach has turned into a little girl. Woohoo!

Lee points to an interesting article (PDF format) applying Augustinian principles to the war on terror — not the ever-popular “just war theory” but Augustine’s view of imperial powers.

Hugo describes his teenage fling with anti-Semitism.

Marvin has been reading a book on the theology of evolution, and he and blog-mate Jonathan discuss it here, here, here and here.

September 20, 2005

Promises, promises

Filed under: Church and state,Orthopraxis — Camassia @ 2:19 pm

Well, the computer “upgrade” turned into “total rebuild.” And, as it turned out, too much for the friend who was so generously working on it for me, so now I’ve gotta take it to the pros anyway. So posting will remain light while I try to straighten things out.

Meanwhile, just when you thought it was safe to go in the schoolroom again, that Pledge of Allegiance controversy is back. I added my reasons for not liking the pledge down at the bottom of this Think Christian discussion. But it did get me thinking about a point of Mennonite theology that I rarely hear about at my own church: the refusal to take oaths.

This was also brought to mind a couple weeks ago when, in lieu of a new sermon, a visiting pastor did a dramatic reading of the whole Sermon on the Mount. It includes Jesus’ greatest hits, of course — blessed are the poor, love your enemies, etc. — but also included this:

Again, you have heard that it was said to the people long ago, ‘Do not break your oath, but keep the oaths you have made to the Lord.’ But I tell you, Do not swear at all: either by heaven, for it is God’s throne; or by the earth, for it is his footstool; or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King. And do not swear by your head, for you cannot make even one hair white or black. Simply let your ‘Yes’ be ‘Yes,’ and your ‘No,’ ‘No’; anything beyond this comes from the evil one.

I assume this is the reason that Mennonites, as well as Quakers, Jehovah’s Witnesses and other groups, refuse to take any sort of oath. But it is a strange passage, and I’ve never heard it preached on. What does it mean?

It sounds, first of all, like a call to honesty. The last line emphasizes that you should keep your word at all times, and not just when you make a formal oath. It also seems to be implying that, if you swear by this or by that, you are arrogating to yourself a power over things you have no power over; that is, saying, “If I break my word, let X happen,” suggests you have the power to make X happen. But come to think of it, I’m not sure what swearing by something is supposed to mean in the first place. That sort of language isn’t used that much in our society, except by children (“Cross my heart and hope to die…”).

This doesn’t precisely apply to an oath like the Pledge of Allegiance, since it doesn’t actually swear by anything in that way. But the first point — about honesty — does relate to the point I made on Think Christian about the general trivializing of pledges. Breaking one’s word used to be a much more serious offense than in our society, which is why, for instance, even the immoral Herod feels bound to keep his word to Salome because he made it in front of other people. Obviously we don’t want a pledge to bind to the point of cutting innocent people’s heads off. But we live in a society that thinks more contractually than covenantally, and as I wrote in the divorce discussion, even things like marriage vows seem to be made with this unspoken assumption that you don’t really have to keep them if they get hard enough.

In a way then, refusing to take an oath like the Pledge of Allegiance can be a sign not of refusing to make promises, but of actually taking them seriously. You don’t have children sign contracts or make marital engagements, so why have them pledge themselves to a state? And even adults taking the pledge should stop and think if they really mean what they’re saying. Ironically, it says right in our country’s Declaration of Independence that a citizen’s loyalty is conditional, because it’s superseded by our basic inalienable rights. Therefore, a nation is not, even by its highly secular terms, a fit subject for an unconditional pledge.

In Christian terms, there’s even more reason to regard citizen loyalty as conditional. Citizen oaths can run directly into Christian principles, as a certain cop found out. Dwight and I disagreed in that post whether the state should have assumed the cop’s loyalty would be conditioned on his baptism. I fear that the reason for the unclarity on this is that society doesn’t even bother to distinguish between conditional and unconditional oaths any more; we take the most serious-sounding oaths to mean something like, “I’ll try my best.”

September 12, 2005

The kind of day when the Amish have a point

Filed under: Miscellaneous — Camassia @ 1:54 pm

My home computer is presently dismantled and nonfunctioning, and my work computer (along with the rest of L.A.) is being afflicted with intermittent blackouts. So, no posting until the tech mess gets straightened out.

September 8, 2005

When you cry it rains, Africa

Filed under: Politics and society — Camassia @ 3:32 pm

Christy at Dry Bones Dance has been having an interesting discussion on the question “What to do about Africa?” here, here and here. I didn’t have anything to add to the discussion really, but I just read an interesting book review that pondered why Africa is so perpetually dysfunctional:

Lockwood has come up with the missing piece of the jigsaw. It is African politics. The reason that—South Africa apart—sub-Saharan Africa has not developed is that it has not been in the interests of the controlling elites to develop it. In contrast to the “developmental states” of Asia—such as South Korea and Taiwan—which grew rich in the 1970s and 1980s by educating their populations and investing in export industries, Lockwood calls Africa’s states anti-developmental, arguing that they actively discourage business, trade and innovation. In Asia, the rulers, often military men or one-party-state dictators just as in Africa, had a sense of national purpose, and the state broadly functioned for the public good. In Africa, the rulers captured the state, its institutions and sources of wealth, and kept it for themselves. They used it not to generate national wealth, but as sources of patronage to reward followers. Where reforms urged by western donors have threatened their interests, they “have resisted them until they have found ways to secure those interests in other ways,” says Lockwood.

This sounds plausible to me, and agrees with what the aid worker wrote to Christy. But the review never answers the obvious question: why are African and Asian politics so different? I don’t imagine that the Asian autocrats are really nicer or more altruistic than their African counterparts. But it seems that for an Asian, building up your country is a way to fame, glory, immortality, maybe even heaven. Africans, however, don’t seem to see national greatness as a road to personal greatness.

After I took African history in college, I came away with the impression that the continent’s political disunity was always its Achilles heel. The 19th-century military victories of Ethiopia over Italy, and of the Zulus over the British, show that Europe’s technical advantage, while real, was not overwhelming in the face of a large, confident African state. The trouble was that there weren’t a whole lot of large, confident African states south of the Sahara, and the ones there were didn’t last all that long.

Europe’s previous venture in Africa, the slave trade, both exploited and exacerbated this. Many Africans got rich selling slaves, but it cost dearly in political stability. Exploiting a national resource like minerals, for instance, requires a large mobilization of people, which is why medieval African empires like Mali and Ghana were built on gold. But slave-dealing is a business that rewards turning neighbor on neighbor. Why reconcile with your enemy when you literally can sell him down the river? As American demand for slaves grew huge, this business superceded all others in large parts of Africa.

The problem continued after colonialism, when, lacking real indigenous states to work with, Europeans carved up the continent for their own convenience. Here is another sharp contrast to east Asia: most African countries didn’t exist in any form 150 years ago, while most Asian countries are hundreds or thousands of years old. It takes a while for national identity to develop — hell, our own country nearly split in two almost 100 years after its founding. Therefore it isn’t too surprising that Africans should lack a sense of national purpose if they have such a weak sense of nation.

In a way, this brings up a conflict I’ve been writing about a lot here — between the small, personal, traditional version of community and the large, impersonal, modern version. I’ve stuck up for the former a lot, since our own society is increasingly defined by the latter. But the image of African rulers regarding their countries as sources of plunder for themselves, their families and their drinking buddies is an image of personalism gone to seed. Today’s world is a system of nation-states, and I think Africa’s colonial concoctions limp along because they know they need them. But I also understand why Africans may not be over-eager to imitate the West. The Western shift to modernity destroyed or weakened many things, things that many are still struggling to hold on to. Not everyone wants to be a cog in the machine of Progress, and I don’t entirely blame them.

Finding the balance between the large and the small, the personal and the political, is perhaps the big unspoken challenge of the modern world. In my last post on divorce (that was the last in the series, by the way), I told Graham that I don’t accept the dichotomy between social justice and personal holiness. To me, the dichotomy is a way of saying that either the large matters or the small matters, but not both. Yet the curiously radical assertion of the Gospel is that they all matter. The God who made the heavens and the stars hears the tiny sparrow fall to the ground. If only it were easier to see what God sees.

September 6, 2005

Divorce: you don’t know how it feels

Filed under: Religion and sex — Camassia @ 12:15 pm

(Part of a series. See parts one, two, three, and four.)

One issue that inevitably comes up in discussing divorce — especially if, like me, you’ve never been married, let alone divorced — is how fit other people are to judge someone’s decision to get one. Especially in the Think Christian discussion, a common refrain was: “You weren’t in my shoes, you can’t possibly know what it was like!”

This is true, which is why in this whole discussion I haven’t pointed fingers at anyone’s specific divorce. And as Christians we are generally admonished not to judge each other. But I think that, in modern urban churches at least, there’s probably too much complacency about our own ignorance. Are marriages each so unique that we really can’t know what they are like, or is it that we don’t want to know?

I was raised with a very strong ethic of noninterference in people’s love lives. I realized how much my attitude had drifted during a recent discussion with my mother. One reason I’ve been so interested in the whole subject of marriage and divorce lately is that I’ve been dating a man from PMC the last seven months, who has occasionally commented here under the name John Paul. (No, he wasn’t named after the Pope; it’s a family thing.) When my mother was out here last month we all went camping together. Later we were talking on the phone, and she asked me if it was OK if she talked to other members of the family about him, since they were bound to be curious.

The question struck me as odd. There was nothing scandalous about him; why shouldn’t she tell other people about him? But it reminded me that a month or two earlier John had asked me what he should tell his friends about the state of our relationship, since they were also curious. When I mentioned this to my mother her first reaction was, “How do they know you’re dating?”

“Well, it’s pretty obvious,” I said. “We always sit together in church. And in a community of 130 people you don’t expect this sort of thing to be a secret.”

She seemed to understand that, but the conversation said a lot about how powerful the presumption of privacy is in urban liberal America. Yet people’s curiosity is still there — it’s just not respected. So people’s natural interest in each other’s lives seems to have been subverted into a kind of seamy underground, where people dig into the details of celebrities’ infidelities and divorces but know little about those of their neighbors.

Yet I think there are good reasons, as well as prurient ones, to know about your neighbor’s marriage. As I said in the last post, people are great at rationalizing, and so if your spouse is the only person to provide an outside perspective on your behavior, and you’re having a dispute with your spouse, your own self-delusions can wind up being your highest authority. More to the point, if you leave marital disputes entirely to a contest between two people, it seems inevitable that the stronger one will win. How does it resolve the abuse-of-power problem in the last post to draw a veil of secrecy around marital disputes, and accept whatever outcome emerges?

Now, I realize that involving the neighbors doesn’t always help things. Sometimes the community has warped values. Sometimes the stronger party can smooth-talk people to his or her side and gain even more advantage. Priests and pastors are not necessarily experts on marriage (especially if they’re celibate). But I do get frustrated hearing everybody explain why there may be too much divorce out there, but their own divorce was unavoidable. Given the sheer number of divorces out there, surely they can’t all be right.

Overcoming the current assumptions of privacy can be hard. Nathan the Perth Anabaptist wrote last month about trying to get his church to help decide whether he should get married:

What I think we’re hoping to do is drag the marriage process out of the closet. To not just wait until there’s an announcement of engagement to tell the people in the church. But since we are a body of people whose lives affect each other, instead to seek counsel and advice from everyone.

But of course, some thought we were announcing an engagement. An engagement is a bit late to be seeking people’s advice. I want advice before I get engaged, and so does Nicole.

I remember a church I used to go to, it was small too but I witnessed two engagements that shouldn’t have happened unexpectedly pounced on everyone. It was only three years ago, but one of them’s over already. I don’t think the church should make the decision for you, but it should at least ask you questions and relate the experiences of other members. Otherwise we’ll repeat the mistakes of others and not have any accountability.

I think this was a good move on Nathan’s part (and a brave one). Another thing that might be helpful, and that might formalize the process, is to get “old marrieds” to mentor younger ones. I remember Telford told me that before he was married he spent time in a singles group at Lake Avenue Church, a big evangelical church in Pasadena. The experience was mostly hideous (this was apparently his first encounter with the common evangelical attitude that singlehood is a curable disease), but the one meeting he did like was when some folks who’d been married 40 years or more came in to tell their war stories. When I think about it, I myself have heard very few detailed stories (in church or out) of marriages that have survived crises, which reinforces the feeling that divorce is natural and inevitable.

Although Lee recently mocked evangelicals for acting like chastity is such a big achievement, I do think it is harder in our society than it was for a lot of Christians in the past, at least after the Roman era. Your average medieval peasant wasn’t surrounded by media always trying to titillate and arouse him, or a near-cult of romantic love, or people sleeping around and seeming to suffer no consequences for it. I wouldn’t say it’s as hard as being shot full of arrows, certainly, but I do see the need for communal as well as individual action on this sort of thing.

Does anyone else have other ideas for how churches can help?

September 4, 2005

Divorce: it’s all about power

Filed under: Religion and sex — Camassia @ 6:46 pm

(Part of a series. See parts one, two, and three.)

There’s another theory about Jesus’ sayings against divorce that is especially popular with left-leaning Christians, including the ones at my church. It’s that Jesus was speaking to men in a patriarchal society about abusing people who were dependent on them. Women, in those days, were financially dependent on their husbands and could not initiate a divorce, so the institution itself was a product of male entitlement.

I expect that is basically true, since like I said, Jesus generally defended women against male abuse. What worries me about it isn’t so much the basic idea, as the assumption that therefore it doesn’t really apply to us if we have a modern egalitarian marriage or if we are the weaker party in the marriage. (Lynn gives a Quaker example of that line of thinking here.) I think that assumption is hazardous on two fronts.

One, I think it is tempting for people to compare their own marriages to a patriarchal stereotype — husband as autocrat, wife as helpless victim — that was probably not the norm even in Jesus’ day. I wrote here and here about James Ault’s analysis of how the actual interaction between genders in a traditional society can be more complicated than the official patriarchy, and it seems likely that similar dynamics were at work in ancient Judea. And in fact, there are lots of idiosyncratic factors that affect the balance of power in any given relationship: the personalities involved, their intelligence, their social influence, who is more in love, etc. I have trouble believing Jesus was too unsophisticated to notice this.

Conversely, I think some caution is called for in believing our own official account of our marriages, that they are voluntary unions of two equal parties. For the same reasons I mentioned above, the actual balance of power can be quite lopsided even in a relationship of legal equality. In fact, who has the power in a relationship may be extremely unclear. It seems like almost an axiom of relational conflict, that people see themselves as victims and the other person as the oppressor. It may be because it’s true, but it may be because people are great at rationalizing.

In fact, it seems to me that one reason hierarchies are so popular is that they automatically settle such disputes. If one party gets the ultimate say in things, and everyone else has to go along, then unity is maintained. But if you have a situation like modern marriages, with parties of equal number and equal claims to power, then it’s not surprising that conflicts often seem unresolvable.

But if you don’t want to go in for the conservative “male headship” models — and I don’t — then who breaks the impasses? That will be the subject of my next post.

September 2, 2005

Divorce: the body’s promise

Filed under: Religion and sex — Camassia @ 7:27 pm

(Part of a series. See parts one and two.)

Lee pointed me to a fascinating article by John Howard Yoder on divorce. There are a lot of points in it that I may cover at another time, but right now I want to focus on Yoder’s answer to the question: what makes a marriage? To Catholics, it’s the sacrament enacted by the Church. To the secular world, it’s a legal marriage license. To Yoder, it’s sex.

Yoder takes 1 Corinthians 6:15 quite literally: any time you have sex, you become “one flesh” with that person, which in the Bible is an image of marriage. He argues that this was the ancient Hebrew view, and so that was the view that Jesus would have assumed. This then, creates an even more stringent version of the remarriage ban than Catholicism has, since Catholicism only recognizes marriages as valid if they were formed with a certain intent. Yet Yoder also recognizes that second marriages are real, since the spouses also became “one flesh.” Therefore he thinks churches should accept second marriages that have already happened, but not be in the business of performing them.

But what of sex performed under very adverse conditions — like incest, or rape? Here Yoder makes an odd comparision between a marriage and a fetus. A fetus is a human being (this being an uncontested fact in his circles, I suppose) but may not be viable; likewise a sex act may make a marriage, but they marriage is not viable. This is how Yoder interprets Paul’s words about sex with prostitutes.

There are some things I like about Yoder’s argument. I like the way he grounds the idea of marriage in bodily reality; it is neither the technical legal definition that has little to do with people’s behavior, nor the sacramental vision that seems too rarified for sinful mortals to set foot in. It also punctures the modern confidence in the supremacy of conscious intent; it asserts that when we have sex, our bodies are fulfilling their own agendas. I’m reminded of the line from the movie Vanilla Sky that came up in a previous discussion: “Don’t you know that when you sleep with someone, your body makes a promise even if you don’t?”

But reading the essay, I felt like Yoder was going a bit too far with the sex = marriage thing. A few years ago Telford responded to a student query on this very subject and said that while there are some passages in the Bible that support sex = marriage, others do not. He pointed to Exodus 22:16-17, and more importantly to Jesus’ line to the woman at the well: “You have had five husbands, and the one you now have is not your husband.”

The difference may be more semantic than substantive, however. Yoder admits that sex doesn’t exactly create a full-blown marriage, but is more of a beginning point:

In very few societies is becoming married instantaneous. There is normally a sequence of stages no one of which is uniquely decisive. That means that there is always in every culture some point at which a “minimal marriage” exists in the absence of some of the important other things that marriage must properly mean. It must always be said that each stage calls for the others, that whole marriage is preferable to minimal marriage, and especially that “true love” will call for such wholeness of expression. Therefore what is questionable about “pre-marital sex” is not that it is sex, nor that it is “pre-marital” (which, by definition, it is not), but that the avoidance of legality and publicity, the postponement of common residence and finances, and the withholding of the public pledge, constitute both a handicap for the marriage’s success and prima facie reason for doubt as to whether the “love” is “true.”

I think that what both Yoder and Telford are getting at here is that in ancient Jewish society — as in most premodern societies — sex created a social expectation and obligation to marry, which was real and irrevocable but not quite the same as marriage itself. As the Exodus passage indicates, it was possible to avoid marriage but not without damage to both parties. This makes sex somewhat less than marriage, but somewhat more consequential than our current society generally takes it to be.

The more radical implication of Yoder’s theory is that a person could therefore be “married” to more than one person at a time. The conclusion this leads him to, when he discusses pragmatic dealings with marriages and divorces, is that de facto polygamy is a better way to deal with human weakness than serial monogamy. Describing the amicable parting and remarriage of someone he knows, Yoder writes, “So now ontologically or ‘in God’s eyes’ James has two wives. With the second one he lives. With the first he shares the parenting of a daughter who loves both parents, and is not torn between them. He loves both wives, in different ways.”

This is actually a highly respectable position, seeing as about 90% of human societies have agreed with it, including most of the ones in the Bible. In fact, the only biblical society I can think of that preferred serial monogamy was Rome, which is hardly held up as a moral paragon. The difficulty, though, is in not allowing polygamy to turn normative, as it has in so many cultures. In a way, the American divorce rate is a testimony to our belief in monogamy — we don’t take a “sophisticated” European attitude of “men screw around, what can you do?” But it is a worthwhile challenge to Western notions that because we practice monogamy, we’re better — a monogamy that may be more imagined than real.

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