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March 30, 2010

Defiance

Filed under: Books — Camassia @ 8:19 pm

A little over a year ago, after reading David Denby’s review of Defiance, I thought to myself, “I don’t really want to see that movie, but it sounds like an interesting book.” I got distracted by other things, however, and still haven’t seen the movie, but recently I picked up the book from the library, and am about halfway through it. And it is really fascinating.

What brought the book back to my mind, actually, was the Tea Party movement. There’s a persistent fantasy in the American mind about the small, working-class, gun-toting rebels facing down a distant tyrannical central government. In the story Defiance chronicles, a group of Jews in Nazi-occupied eastern Europe briefly lived it out. Equally as important as the rebel aspect is the class inversion. As Denby puts it, “The farmers or working-class men who could shoot, gut an animal, and build a shelter were sought out as protectors by the women, including the educated, upper-middle-class women; the formerly desirable scholars of Hegel, Marx, and the Talmud were not.” So the wholesome, masculine proles proved they were better than the fancy educated liberal elitists. Even though they’re in Belorussia, what could be more American?

The reality of it was something like that. But as usual, life was more complicated than stereotype. Group leader Tuvia Bielski is a peasant farmer, but he’s also a natural-born politician. Charismatic, gregarious and intelligent, he learns German as a child by befriending German soldiers occupying the area, grows up to marry a rich older woman for shamelessly mercenary reasons (whom he later dumps for another woman), makes friends among the many ethnic groups of the region, and supplements his meager education with extensive reading. A friend from the time remarks that the little town they were living in seemed to small for him.

Even so, Tuvia sort of backs into his role as a rebel leader. Initially, he and other locals run off into the woods just to survive. Only later does a plan to fight the Germans develop, and only then is Tuvia chosen over his brothers as the leader. (Author Nechama Tec suggests this was partly because of the Jewish habit of deferring to the oldest son, although it’s also clear that Tuvia has the best personality for it.) The military wing of the group is off to a slow start, however, partly because it’s so difficult for them to find weapons. The Nazis have no NRA to worry about, so they just kill everyone who has them. So far in the book, the rebels have killed only one enemy, and he actually isn’t a Nazi but a Nazi-collaborating local policeman.

They’ve already had to make some huge moral compromises, though, which is another fascinating thing about the story in light of current events. Jeffrey Goldberg brought up the film version of Defiance when interviewing Quentin Tarantino about Inglourious Basterds a few months back, leading them to a discussion about whether Jews should even much worry about the morality of torturing and killing Nazis. The Bielski detachment of the book, however, has other ethical quandaries before killing Nazis even comes up. For one, they rob the local peasants to get their supplies. They try to do this with a minimum of violence — they even carve sticks to look like guns, which works well enough at night — and they try to target those they think can afford it. But Tec’s subjects, interviewed many years later, admit that they were adding to the afflictions of a peasantry that was already afflicted by the Nazis and the gangs of Red Army soldiers still wandering around. They just felt that they had no choice. The need for such basic sustenance is one of those things that movie rebellions always gloss over.

Another compromise was their alliance with the Soviets. We know what Stalin was, of course, but even in the book’s smaller scale, the Russian soldiers we’ve met so far are very unpleasant characters. Some of them are Jew-haters themselves, and, as one source understates it, “They were extremely fond of vodka.” Although there are a few Communists among the local Jewry, the overriding reason they support the Soviets is that they feel, justifiably, that the Red Army is their only hope for ultimately the Nazis. The western Allies are still far away at this point, so they make do with what they have.

This, probably more than anything, is what keeps the story from being a Tarantino fantasy. The Bielskis want to die like men, but they also recognize their own impotence. As much as Tec highlights the importance of their resistance, in contrast to the more typical images of Jews as passive victims, the Bielskis are ultimately also waiting for a much bigger war machine to rescue them. And so they have neither the moral purity of the ghetto victims, nor the masculine heroism of American mythology. Instead, like most people, they live somewhere in between.

March 5, 2010

“What’s on the telos tonight?” “Looks like a penguin!”

Filed under: Interfaith relations — Camassia @ 9:19 pm

Eve responds to my post on morality without God, and is not entirely convinced:

I do think they’re right to say you can’t get teleology from undirected nature–you need a Creator–and that most moral arguments do rely on teleology. Most moral arguments rely on an account of human nature which is about what humans should be, not what humans demonstrably are. In fact I’m not sure how you’d get a moral, “should” argument from a bare evidentiary “are” claim.

I think that the problem here is the assumption that, if you say nature as a whole has no direction, nothing within nature can have a direction. But I don’t believe that’s the case.

Consider how your existence started out: as DNA. It was not you, but it set you on a certain course. You progressed from being a zygote to a fetus to a baby to child and so on until you eventually grow old and die. Various things can influence, frustrate or even halt this process, of course. But the point is, it doesn’t just proceed randomly with no direction. You don’t have an equal chance of waking up tomorrow being physically a day older, and waking up having regressed to age six.

Also, to say that it’s natural is not to say that it doesn’t take work. You can’t just sit there like a plant, and grow. At the very least, you have to feed yourself, and protect yourself from the elements and so on. You have a drive to do these things, and wherever you have a drive, you have goals. You want things to be a certain way that they are not right now. And so, being human isn’t a fixed state, it is a process of becoming. That process is itself largely fixed, but it also takes some effort on your part.

There’s also a mental component to the process, and this is where we get to the matter at hand. If I had to posit a single source of a secular-humanist telos, it would be the assumption that the human mind is also set on a certain course from birth, but it is likewise a fragile process that requires some work to fully develop. And so, we get norms: there are some actions you can take that further this course, and others that pervert it. As with getting food (for most of humanity anyway), this can be difficult and frustrating, and the satisfactions only temporary. But still, the course is there.

The experience I described in the last post — seeing yourself, and judging yourself, as if you were another person — is a case in point. This capacity is something that babies don’t have, and that children develop only gradually. It takes effort, it competes with your other desires, and a few people seem never to develop it at all. That doesn’t make it unnatural, just difficult. But the very fact that it’s a struggle gives it direction. You can’t just sit there like a plant, and be just; you have to aim for justice.

Also, though I’m talking about individuals here, there’s nothing to say that groups can’t have a natural telos. Ant colonies, for instance, have life cycles resembling those of single organisms. Since people are also social beings, it’s reasonable to think such things happen with human societies as well, though it may be difficult to tell while it’s happening. So, it’s possible to have secular versions of these, “Is society headed the right way?” types of discussions.

I think that may relate to Eve’s question later in the post: “But within this human-scale morality, can we ever say you should love someone you don’t? Can we say to the Spartan citizen that he should see himself in the face of the helot?” That’s an interesting question, because I think most of us have a very unmystical familiarity with the feeling that we ought to love, or at least like, someone we don’t: a difficult relative, usually, or someone that everyone else seems to love but who just doesn’t do it for us. If that mandate doesn’t come directly from heaven, it generally comes from an ideal vision of social relationships: families love each other, friends like each other’s friends, etc. It’s also, I suspect, just a matter of identity: we are who our people are, so finding someone unlikeable within one’s group can be as distressing as finding someone unlikable in the mirror.

Now, the second part of Eve’s question: how do you convince someone to love someone who’s not in his group? The type of instinctive empathy I wrote about earlier does depend on an assumption of similarity, which is why a great way to start a fight among scientific materialists is to start talking about innate group differences (between genders, races, or whatever). Still, the funny thing about our modern world is that, although we encounter a lot more outsiders than in the past, this also makes us more likely to be outsiders in some situations, and so paradoxically identify with people precisely because of their otherness.

But really, the honest answer to what I’d say to Spartan is: I don’t know. Like I said before, I’m not saying this is the most fabulous grounding for a moral code. Because natural selection is about good-enough rather than perfection, it’s possible that human moral capacity has a very low ceiling. There’s also an obvious limit to how much justice we, as humans, can enact, which is why I find Marvin’s reason for believing rather more powerful than Fish’s. I’m also not saying it allows you to persuade nonbelievers of whatever you want; I don’t doubt that, to agree with every point of Catholic morality, you have to convert to Catholicism. What I am doubting, though, is Fish’s contention that there’s no way for a truly consistent scientific materialists to have morals. You might disagree with them, but there is something to disagree with.

March 3, 2010

Morality without God

Filed under: Interfaith relations — Camassia @ 11:00 pm

Eve links to a column by Stanley Fish disputing the idea that there are “secular reasons” for moral and political positions, and rounds up her own thoughts about the issue. She asks, “What are the possible objects for the philosopher’s eros, the nuptial meaning of the mind, in a fully secular worldview? I dunno, because I’ve never done it, but I welcome your thoughts.”

Well, I’m not sure I entirely understand the question, but here are my thoughts about Fish’s column. I think that first, we need to define “secular.” The way Fish describes it, it comes across as “logic without emotion.” For instance:

While secular discourse, in the form of statistical analyses, controlled experiments and rational decision-trees, can yield banks of data that can then be subdivided and refined in more ways than we can count, it cannot tell us what that data means or what to do with it. No matter how much information you pile up and how sophisticated are the analytical operations you perform, you will never get one millimeter closer to the moment when you can move from the piled-up information to some lesson or imperative it points to; for it doesn’t point anywhere; it just sits there, inert and empty.

That’s true of course, but that’s simply because you have to add emotions to your facts to be motivated to do anything. Eve is right that love is the driving force here — both convictions and actions are caused by people caring about things. But I don’t see how that is opposed to secularity, unless you’re claiming that caring is inherently religious. It’s true that love of anything can probably take on religious qualities if it gets strong enough; but I don’t think that’s what people mean when they talk about religion as in “religion in public life.”

I suspect that what Fish is really getting at here is not that you can’t make decisions without religion, but that you can’t impose your decisions on other people without it. This is why he approvingly quotes Smith as saying that “truncated discursive resources available within the downsized domain of ‘public reason’ are insufficient to yield any definite answer to a difficult issue — abortion, say, or same sex marriage, or the permissibility of torture . . . .” I must admit, after having been to as many churches and theoblogs as I have, my immediate response is, “It’s not like religion has settled any of those things definitively either!” Sometimes in these discussions, it sounds like what people mean by religion isn’t religion as it actually exists, but the dream (or nightmare) of an authority who has an answer for literally everything.

But, overall, Fish has a point. When people complain about religion intruding into the public sphere, they are usually complaining that their opponents are invoking sources of authority that they haven’t agreed are authorities. Yet what, really, is a secular source of authority that everyone can agree on? The appeal to material facts stems from a hope that we can, at least, agree on those, since we all live here in the material world. But the motivating principle — emotion — is more elusive. How do you get other people to care about what you care about? And if you care about God more than anything, what do you do if you’re not allowed to talk about him?

Whenever I think about this question of how people have moral beliefs without God, strangely enough, I flash back to the movie City Slickers. I’ve never actually seen it all the way through, but it played at a theater where I used to work, so I saw bits of it when I did screening-room checks. At one point, a man goads his friend about his fidelity to his wife, demanding to know if would really refuse to cheat on her if he could be absolutely sure she wouldn’t know. The friend eventually says, “But I would know. And I wouldn’t like myself for it.”

This is, as I recall, a version of the question that starts off Plato’s Republic: why be good if you can just seem good? Plato somehow answers this with the hypothetical creation of an ideal state, but I expect most people would better understand the movie character’s more concise version. This experience of looking at yourself as if you were someone else, and liking or disliking what you see — in other words, having a conscience — is essentially a brute fact for nearly all people. They have varying explanations of why it exists, or they may have no explanation, but still it’s there. And this experience compels at least a rudimentary morality; if you like people who are good to you, then you must be good to them, if you are going to like yourself. By the same token, if you respect people who don’t take crap from you, you’re going to be uncompromising towards others if you want to respect yourself. I didn’t say this was all warm and fuzzy. But it’s also why I don’t entirely agree with Fish’s claim that ideas like justice and equality are totally empty without God. The ability to see yourself as a person among persons, to put yourself in another’s place, implies a certain equality, or at least similarity. There’s a certain justice that comes when you dislike yourself in proportion to the cause you’ve given someone to dislike you. And — this is the less obvious point — this identification with others also means that you assume other people have that capacity, and can therefore make claims on them. I think this is why these words have meaning for people, even if they can’t agree on precisely what they mean or how to apply them to a given situation.

Of course, you can readily object that this is an inadequate basis for morality, and I can’t really argue with that. But, like I said, it’s not like any religions have been able to overcome all these problems either. It’s why the gulf between the religious and the secular here may not be as great as all that. Without love of God, we still have each other; and that’s something.

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