Proposition 14
This isn’t the first time we in California have voted on some sort of open primary, but the third. Joel has taken a position of principle on these initiatives, similar to that of the ACLU, that parties should get to control their own primaries, and so his choice is simple; each time this comes up he votes no. I have taken no position of principle, instead looking each time this comes up and trying to decide how each version of our election system will be gamed, although, the last two times we voted, this analysis brought me to the same NO vote that Joel started out with.
So, this time, I had two questions: 1) How does Proposition 14 differ from the last two propositions, and 2) How come, this time, the legislature has voted for the proposition? The overall picture of endorsements looks like what I remember from before, with editorial boards of newspapers liking the idea and all political parties disliking it, but last time, the legislature submitted a counter-proposition, while this time, they’re the ones submitting the proposition, with what looks like a solid majority.
The answer to the second question turns out to be simple. The legislature approved putting Proposition 14 on the ballot because Abel Maldonado asked that as the price of his support for Schwarzenegger’s budget.
The answer to the second question turns out to be, Proposition 14 is very similar to one of the two earlier propositions, Proposition 62. The history of California’s primary system is this: We had closed primaries until 1996. Under this system, if you didn’t state a party preference, you didn’t get to vote in anyone’s primaries (and if you did state a preference, you voted only in your own party’s primary). In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 198, which simply allowed everyone to vote in everyone’s primary, while keeping the rule that each party’s top vote getter would advance to the general election. (If I remember right, I voted against this one on the grounds that people could game the system by voting for the opposing party’s weakest candidate.) This is called a blanket primary system. In 2000, the US Supreme Court threw this initiative out as unconstitutional. Soon after this, the California legislature passed a bill changing our system to a modified closed primary system. Under this system, political parties can choose to allow people to vote in their primaries if they decline to state a party preference, something both the Republicans and the Democrats have chosen to do.
Enter the next attempt to change California’s primary system, Proposition 62. Proposition 62, which is similar to the current Proposition 14 but different from the overturned Proposition 198, would have replaced California’s partisan primary system, for most offices, with a Top Two system, in which the top two candidates advance to the general election regardless of party. The legislature put a competing proposition on the ballot, Proposition 60, which reaffirmed the parties’ rights to keep their primaries closed. Proposition 60 won and Proposition 62 lost. That same year, Washington state passed a similar initiative, so that now Washington and Louisiana both use Top Two systems.
Rose Report, the blog of the Rose Institute of state and local government and Clarement McKenna College suggests that Proposition 14 may fare better than Proposition 62 did.
In 2004, California voters had the opportunity to vote on Proposition 62 – the Voter Choice Open Primary Act. In all practical purposes, this Act was identical to Proposition 14 – yet it failed to pass (54%-46%). Despite the identical consequences of these two propositions, there are several differences that may lead to a better fate for Proposition 14. Unlike Proposition 62, which qualified through the citizen signature process, Proposition 14 was put on the ballot by the legislature, which allowed its supporters to write their own, very favorable, title and ballot summary. In 2004, the Legislature intentionally distracted and confused the voters by putting on the ballot Proposition 60, which guaranteed parties the right to nominate their own candidates. Proposition 60, however, appeared earlier on the ballot than Proposition 62 and ultimately passed. So far, no such “poison pill” competing measure has been put on the 2010 ballot.
While in 2004 California voted to keep a closed primary, the political climate in California has since changed and early polls indicate that Proposition 14 will pass comfortably. A 2009 poll conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California shows that 70% of Californians support a shift to an open primary system. If Proposition 14 does pass, it may still be brought to court because of the controversial nature of the issue and the Supreme Court’s limited ruling in the Washington case. But based on its rulings so far in the Washington case, it is unlikely that the Court would invalidate Proposition 14.
Rose Report also links a report by the Public Policy Institute of California that details the pros and cons of a Top Ten Vote Getter (TTGV) system.
What are the arguments in favor of TTVG? Its advocates most commonly cite its potential to increase moderation in the state’s political parties. Currently, members of the California legislature and congressional delegation vote mostly along party lines. Many TTVG supporters feel that this partisanship prevents legislators from finding pragmatic solutions to the state’s problems. They suggest that semi-closed primaries are at least partly to blame because the primary voters in each major party tend to be ideologically extreme: Democrats are more liberal than the general electorate and Republicans are more conservative. These voters tend to nominate extreme candidates, who become the only viable choices in the fall campaign, leaving voters in the middle without a moderate alternative.
In addition to bolstering political moderation, supporters argue, TTVG is likely to increase both competiveness and voter turnout, since a broader range of voters would be able to cast a vote in each race. This argument may have special force because of the large and growing number of decline-to-state voters, who do not explicitly identify with any political party and who may feel especially constrained under the current system.
What about the cons? One of the most common objections to TTVG is that it will encroach upon each party’s right to control its own fate. Open primaries give voters who have not taken an interest in the success of a party—and may even have actively opposed its goals—as much say in deciding its nominees as those who have been dedicated followers (Jones 1996). Opponents express particular concern about raiders: voters who seek to clear the way for their own party’s nominee by voting for the weakest candidate in the opposing party. Since this weak candidate may also be more extreme, substantial raiding could undermine TTVG’s moderating effect.
Another concern is that the TTVG system will limit choice. Smaller parties are likely to be excluded from the fall election, since their candidates rarely manage to finish first or second in a primary. And a TTVG primary can result in two candidates of the same party facing each other in the fall. How often has this happened in the two TTVG primary states, Louisiana and Washington? Since 1991, 17 percent of Louisiana’s House primaries, 12 percent of its Senate primaries, and 9 percent of its U.S. House primaries have produced same-party runoffs.7 In Washington, which began using TTVG in 2008, the numbers are lower: 6 percent of its House primaries, 2 percent of its Senate primaries, and none of its U.S. House races produced same-party runoffs.8
Finally, some TTVG opponents argue that weakening party influence in elections will create a vacuum that will be filled by organized interests with agendas that are less transparent and public-spirited. For instance, the liquor lobby had enormous and outsized influence over the California legislature in the 1940s and ’50s, when a form of open primary was in use and party control was generally weaker (Masket 2004)….
An analysis follows, in which the PPIC looks at data from California’s blanket primary system years (from 1996-2000) to answer the questions: How common is crossover voting in open primaries? Why do voters cross over, and what crossover candidates do they vote for? How common is raiding (voting for the other party’s weakest candidate)? What is the actual effect of an open primary system on the candidates selected?
One of the questions discussed is whether open primaries actually have the moderating effect that their supporters expect. Opponents argue that open primaries can just as easily work the other way, concentrating extremist voters and splitting moderates, and point to the case of Louisiana*, where one Top Two vote getter primary famously resulted in a run off election between Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke and a former governor, Edwin Edwards, who was widely considered corrupt, but who had the advantage of not being racist. This election is epitomized by the bumper sticker it inspired, “Vote for the Crook. It’s Important.”
The PPIC’s conclusion on the moderation argument is that, though open primaries don’t necessarily lead to moderation,
The evidence—much of it from California’s experience with the blanket primary—points toward a slight advantage to moderate candidates. Moderates were more likely to be elected to the Assembly in the blanket primary years of 1998 and 2000 (Gerber 2002; Paul 1998). Voting in the Assembly was more bipartisan during those years (see the technical appendix).12 And it is often argued that a higher number of strongly liberal bills were killed at the committee stage.
The overall effect, according to the PPIC, would be modest.
Because voters often cross party lines to support incumbents, a TTVG system would be just as likely as the current system to maintain the status quo. However, incumbency helps keep officials in office whether they are moderate or highly partisan….
* I’m pulling this example off anti-Proposition 14 web sites, not from the PPIC report.